Faith, Power, Commerce and the Intellectual Evolution of Western Civilisation
Knowledge, Authority, Cultural Exchange and the Human Capacity to Question Established Beliefs

By Andrew Klein
Introduction: The Architecture of Belief
A civilisation that cannot question itself eventually becomes a prisoner of its own explanations.
And thus, we create prisons of the mind.
Unlike physical prisons, these require neither walls nor guards. Their boundaries are constructed from inherited assumptions, unquestioned beliefs, ideological loyalties and explanations that have become so familiar that they are mistaken for reality.
Those who inhabit these prisons may be entirely unaware of their confinement. They are free in the traditional sense, yet unable to recognise the intellectual restraints that shape their understanding of the world.
The bars are invisible because they have become part of the landscape.
The danger is not that people hold beliefs, possess convictions or find meaning in shared traditions. These are fundamental aspects of human experience.
The danger arises when the examination of those beliefs becomes unacceptable; when questioning is interpreted as disloyalty, disagreement as hostility and changing one’s mind as defeat.
At that point, belief ceases to be a means of understanding the world and becomes a means of protecting an existing interpretation of it.
The history of Western civilisation offers numerous examples of this tension. It also offers something considerably more encouraging: evidence that intellectual development has repeatedly depended upon the willingness to encounter ideas beyond established cultural, religious and political boundaries.
The Greeks inherited and transformed knowledge from earlier civilisations. Rome absorbed and developed Greek intellectual traditions. Medieval European scholarship was enriched by knowledge transmitted through Islamic, Jewish and Christian intellectual communities. The Renaissance and Enlightenment emerged from centuries of scholarship, cultural exchange, technological development and challenges to inherited authority.
None of these developments occurred in isolation.
Nor did they occur without resistance.
This chapter examines five historical periods to investigate the relationship between knowledge, authority, commerce and intellectual freedom.
Our purpose is not to condemn particular religions or celebrate particular civilisations. It is to examine a recurring human problem:
What happens when institutions established to preserve knowledge, meaning and social order begin to regard the questioning of their authority as a threat?
I. THE ANCIENT MEDITERRANEAN
The movement of knowledge: Egypt, Mesopotamia, Phoenicia, Greece and Rome
The intellectual history of Western civilisation did not begin in Greece.
It emerged from a much older and geographically interconnected world.
Long before Plato and Aristotle, societies in Mesopotamia and Egypt had developed sophisticated systems of mathematics, astronomy, medicine, administration, architecture and written communication.
These were not isolated achievements. They developed within societies connected by trade, migration, warfare, diplomacy and cultural exchange.
Mesopotamia and Egypt: Knowledge before classical Greece
Mesopotamian civilisations developed extensive mathematical and astronomical traditions.
Babylonian scholars maintained detailed astronomical records, developed sophisticated numerical methods and constructed systems for predicting celestial events.
Egyptian civilisation developed mathematical practices associated with land measurement, construction, taxation and administration. Its architectural achievements required substantial practical knowledge of geometry, measurement and engineering.
These traditions were not identical to the later Greek philosophical approach to knowledge.
Their importance lies partly in demonstrating that systematic investigation of the natural world existed long before the classical Greek period.
The Greeks encountered intellectual traditions that were already mature.
Greek thinkers subsequently developed distinctive approaches to abstraction, demonstration, philosophical argument and the search for general explanations.
The relationship was one of transmission, adaptation and further development, not simply invention.
Phoenicia: The power of a transferable idea
The development of alphabetic writing provides a particularly revealing example.
The Greek alphabet was adapted from Phoenician writing, itself part of a much longer history of alphabetic development in the eastern Mediterranean and Near East.
The Greeks made an important modification by adapting characters to represent vowel sounds.
This development had enormous consequences for written communication.
It illustrates something fundamental about intellectual progress.
A civilisation does not need to invent every component of its intellectual infrastructure to make a significant contribution.
It can receive an existing idea, recognise its possibilities, modify it and extend its usefulness.
The Greek alphabet was not an isolated invention. It was a development within a much longer history of cultural interaction.
Greece: The emergence of philosophical inquiry
Ancient Greece nevertheless made distinctive and enduring contributions.
Thinkers began asking questions that would become central to Western philosophy:
- What is the nature of reality?
- What constitutes knowledge?
- How should we distinguish appearance from truth?
- What is justice?
- What makes a political system legitimate?
- What is the relationship between reason and belief?
Socrates became particularly important for his method of questioning.
He challenged assumptions, exposed contradictions and demonstrated that people who believed themselves knowledgeable could struggle to explain the foundations of their own convictions.
His execution by Athens in 399 BCE is an uncomfortable historical reminder that societies capable of extraordinary intellectual achievement can also become hostile to dissent.
We should not reduce the trial to a simple confrontation between freedom and tyranny. It occurred within the political and social circumstances of Athens following a period of considerable instability.
Nevertheless, Socrates’ death remains an important example of the tensions between individual inquiry, public authority and established belief.
His intellectual legacy is especially relevant to our subject.
He did not offer a comfortable collection of answers. He offered a method of examination.
Rome: The inheritance and transformation of knowledge
Roman civilisation inherited extensively from Greek intellectual and artistic traditions.
Roman writers studied Greek philosophy, adopted Greek literary forms and incorporated Greek artistic influences.
Yet Roman civilisation was not simply a reproduction of Greece.
It developed its own traditions of law, administration, engineering, military organisation and political thought.
Roman intellectual life also reflected Etruscan, Italic and wider Mediterranean influences.
The important point is that Roman achievement depended substantially upon its ability to absorb and adapt existing knowledge.
The Roman world demonstrates that intellectual development is cumulative.
Civilisations inherit ideas from others, modify them and transmit them to subsequent generations.
They are rarely the sole authors of their own intellectual foundations.
The first lesson
The ancient Mediterranean provides an important starting point for our investigation.
Intellectual achievement was not the exclusive property of one culture.
Knowledge moved between societies. Ideas crossed linguistic and political boundaries. Practical discoveries became theoretical foundations. Existing traditions were questioned, adapted and developed.
Intellectual strength does not require cultural isolation. It requires the capacity to encounter another way of thinking without regarding it as a threat.
II. MEDIEVAL CHRISTIANITY
Religious authority, education and the boundaries of intellectual freedom
The medieval period is frequently characterised as an age in which religious authority dominated European intellectual life.
There is some truth in this description, but it is incomplete.
The medieval Church was simultaneously a religious authority, a political institution, a major landholder, an educational patron and a custodian of written knowledge.
Its contribution to European intellectual development was substantial.
Monasteries preserved manuscripts. Cathedral schools educated clergy and administrators. Universities emerged as important centres of learning.
Medieval scholars debated theology, philosophy, law, logic and the natural world.
It would be historically inaccurate to describe the entire period as intellectually dormant.
Indeed, the development of medieval universities represented a significant expansion of European scholarly activity.
The university and the authority of knowledge
The University of Bologna developed around the study of law. Paris became an important centre of theology and philosophy. Oxford and Cambridge emerged as major centres of scholarship.
These institutions provided structures through which knowledge could be organised, transmitted and debated.
The scholastic method encouraged the examination of competing propositions through structured argument.
Thomas Aquinas, for example, attempted to reconcile Christian theology with Aristotelian philosophy.
His work demonstrates that religious commitment and intellectual investigation were not necessarily incompatible.
Yet the intellectual environment had limitations.
Theological authority established boundaries within which certain questions could be examined.
The purpose of scholarship was often understood in relation to a broader religious framework. The authority of established doctrine could determine which conclusions were acceptable.
This produced a tension between the pursuit of understanding and the preservation of institutional authority.
Heresy and the limits of permissible disagreement
Medieval religious institutions developed mechanisms for identifying and responding to teachings considered heretical.
The treatment of heresy varied considerably across periods and regions. It could involve theological argument, ecclesiastical penalties, political intervention and, in certain circumstances, coercion and execution.
The important issue for our investigation is not whether every religious authority suppressed intellectual freedom.
It did not.
The issue is what happened when disagreement moved beyond theological debate and was interpreted as a challenge to institutional legitimacy.
When an institution claims authority over the interpretation of truth, disagreement can become more than an intellectual problem.
It can become a political problem.
The distinction between questioning an idea and challenging the authority of the institution becomes increasingly difficult to maintain.
The duality of the Church
We must acknowledge both sides.
Christian institutions preserved and transmitted substantial bodies of knowledge. They supported education, scholarship and philosophical inquiry.
They also exercised authority over intellectual and religious life, sometimes restricting the circulation of particular ideas and punishing dissent.
These activities were not mutually exclusive.
The same institution could preserve Aristotle while restricting particular interpretations of his philosophy.
It could support universities while maintaining boundaries around acceptable doctrine.
It could encourage intellectual inquiry while resisting conclusions perceived to threaten religious authority.
This is precisely the duality that interests us.
The preservation of knowledge and the preservation of authority are not necessarily the same undertaking. Sometimes they reinforce one another. Sometimes they conflict.
III. THE CRUSADES
Faith, political power and commercial interests
The Crusades offer an especially revealing examination of the relationship between religious conviction and institutional power.
Beginning with Pope Urban II’s call at Clermont in 1095, the Crusading movement mobilised European Christians around religious objectives associated with pilgrimage, Jerusalem and the defence of Eastern Christians.
Religious motivation was real.
Many participants understood their involvement in terms of faith, spiritual obligation and the possibility of religious redemption.
We should not dismiss those convictions simply because other interests were also involved.
However, the Crusades took place within a world of political rivalry, territorial ambition, economic competition and institutional authority.
The movement cannot be understood through religious motivation alone.
The intersection of faith and political power
The Crusades offered European rulers, nobles and military leaders opportunities to pursue objectives that extended beyond the stated religious purpose of the expeditions.
Territory could be acquired. Political relationships could be altered. Dynastic interests could be advanced.
The Papacy also exercised considerable influence through its ability to authorise, promote and legitimise military campaigns undertaken in religious terms.
Religious authority and political authority could reinforce one another.
A campaign presented as a spiritual undertaking could simultaneously serve the interests of political leaders.
This does not mean that religious conviction was insincere.
It means that human motivations are frequently more complicated than the public language used to explain collective action.
Venice and the Fourth Crusade
The Fourth Crusade provides one of the clearest examples of this complexity.
The expedition was originally intended to reach the eastern Mediterranean and ultimately recover Jerusalem.
The crusaders contracted with Venice to provide ships and transport.
However, the expedition encountered financial difficulties. The crusaders could not meet their obligations to the Venetian authorities.
The resulting negotiations, political manoeuvring and competing interests contributed to the diversion of the expedition.
In 1202, crusaders attacked Zara, a Christian city on the Adriatic coast.
In 1203, the expedition became entangled in Byzantine dynastic politics.
In April 1204, the crusaders captured and sacked Constantinople, one of the most important Christian cities in the world.
The consequences were profound.
The Byzantine Empire was fragmented, a Latin imperial regime was established, and relations between Eastern and Western Christianity suffered further damage.
Venice acquired substantial commercial and strategic advantages from the outcome.
The expedition’s history demonstrates how financial obligations, political alliances and commercial interests could reshape a campaign originally promoted in religious terms.
Historians continue to debate the relative importance of financial pressure, political ambition, religious conviction and contingency in explaining the diversion.
We should not reduce the entire event to a predetermined commercial conspiracy.
The evidence supports a more complicated explanation.
The irony
A campaign presented as an expression of Christian religious purpose ended with the destruction and looting of a major Christian city.
The contradiction is difficult to ignore.
Religious conviction, political ambition and commercial interests had become entangled in an undertaking whose eventual outcome differed dramatically from its original stated objective.
This raises a question that remains relevant to the examination of institutional power:
When an institution presents its actions as morally ordained, how do we distinguish its professed purpose from the political and commercial interests operating alongside it?
The Crusades demonstrate that a sincerely held belief does not prevent individuals and institutions from pursuing competing interests.
Nor does the language of moral purpose establish the legitimacy of every action undertaken in its name.
IV. THE ISLAMIC INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS
Preservation, transformation and the transmission of knowledge
One of the most important chapters in the intellectual history of Europe concerns the transmission of classical knowledge through Islamic intellectual traditions.
It is also one of the most frequently oversimplified.
Following the expansion of the Islamic world, particularly during the Abbasid period, substantial translation movements developed.
Greek, Persian, Syriac and Indian intellectual traditions entered Arabic scholarship.
This included works on:
- Mathematics.
- Astronomy.
- Medicine.
- Philosophy.
- Logic.
- Geography.
- Natural science.
The translation movement was particularly active between the eighth and tenth centuries, with subsequent developments continuing through the medieval period.
Translation was not simply preservation
The significance of this intellectual movement cannot be reduced to the preservation of Greek manuscripts.
Scholars translated, interpreted, criticised and extended the works they encountered.
The process involved multiple generations of scholars and several languages.
Greek philosophical traditions were examined within new intellectual and theological contexts.
Indian mathematical and astronomical knowledge contributed to developments in the wider Islamic scholarly world.
Persian intellectual traditions also influenced the development of scholarship and administration.
Christian scholars working in Syriac and Arabic were important participants in these processes. Jewish scholars also contributed to the transmission of knowledge between intellectual communities.
Important thinkers
Among the major figures were:
Al-Kindi: An early philosopher who sought to integrate Greek philosophical learning into an Islamic intellectual framework.
Al-Farabi: A philosopher whose work examined political organisation, logic and the relationship between philosophy and religion.
Ibn Sina (Avicenna): A major philosopher and physician whose writings influenced intellectual traditions across the Islamic world and medieval Europe.
Ibn Rushd (Averroes): A philosopher and commentator on Aristotle whose work became particularly influential in Latin European scholasticism.
These thinkers did not simply preserve the achievements of earlier civilisations.
They became contributors to the continuing development of philosophy and science.
The transmission of knowledge into Europe
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, important bodies of Arabic philosophical and scientific literature entered Latin Europe through translation centres including Toledo and Sicily.
The transmission involved Muslim, Jewish and Christian scholars and translators.
European universities subsequently incorporated many of these works into their teaching.
The study of Aristotle, together with the commentaries and interpretations developed by Arabic-speaking philosophers, had a profound influence on medieval European philosophy.
There is an important historical irony here.
Some of the intellectual resources that helped stimulate European scholasticism had been preserved, developed and transmitted through intellectual traditions belonging to cultures that Christian Europe also regarded as religious and political rivals.
The boundaries between civilisations were significant in political and religious terms.
They were not impermeable intellectual boundaries.
Intellectual exchange and institutional authority
The Islamic intellectual world also possessed its own religious and political constraints.
Scholarship developed within particular institutional, theological and political environments. Intellectual disagreement could be encouraged in some settings and restricted in others.
We should therefore avoid replacing one simplistic historical narrative with another.
The Islamic world was not an uninterrupted sanctuary of intellectual freedom, just as medieval Christian Europe was not an uninterrupted period of intellectual suppression.
Both contained remarkable scholars, institutions, controversies and restrictions.
The more important lesson is that intellectual development depended upon the movement of ideas across cultural boundaries.
Knowledge did not belong to the civilisation that first produced it, nor did it cease developing when it crossed into another intellectual tradition.
V. THE EUROPEAN RENAISSANCE AND ENLIGHTENMENT
The expansion of inquiry and the challenge to inherited authority
The European Renaissance and Enlightenment represent important developments in the history of Western intellectual life.
However, they should not be treated as a sudden liberation from an entirely intellectually stagnant past.
They emerged from centuries of scholarship, cultural exchange, commercial development, institutional change and technological innovation.
The Renaissance: The recovery and re-examination of classical learning
Renaissance humanism encouraged renewed engagement with Greek and Roman literature, philosophy, history and political thought.
Scholars sought original texts, compared manuscripts and examined the intellectual traditions of antiquity.
The invention and expansion of printing in Europe during the fifteenth century transformed the conditions under which knowledge could circulate.
Books became easier to reproduce, distribute and acquire, although literacy, cost and access remained significant barriers.
Printing facilitated the circulation of religious, scientific, political and philosophical arguments.
It also created new opportunities for authorities to monitor and restrict publications.
The technology that made intellectual exchange easier also made the regulation of information more important.
The Reformation: Who has the authority to interpret?
The Protestant Reformation challenged established structures of religious authority.
Martin Luther’s criticisms of Church practices and his challenge to particular theological positions helped initiate a transformation of Western Christianity.
The Reformation was not simply an intellectual movement.
It involved political rulers, competing religious institutions, economic interests, popular movements and struggles over authority.
The expansion of vernacular religious texts made religious argument accessible to a wider readership.
Yet the Reformation did not automatically produce universal tolerance.
Protestant and Catholic authorities alike could impose restrictions on religious dissent.
The institutional contest changed, but the desire to regulate belief did not disappear.
The Scientific Revolution: Observation and established explanations
The Scientific Revolution introduced important changes in the investigation of nature.
Thinkers such as Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton contributed to transformations in astronomy, physics and mathematics.
Their work challenged established explanations and encouraged new approaches to observation, experimentation and mathematical reasoning.
Galileo’s conflict with the Roman Inquisition in 1633 illustrates the tension that could arise when scientific conclusions challenged established interpretations of the natural world.
But we should be precise.
The historical conflict was not simply science versus religion. It involved questions of scriptural interpretation, scientific evidence, institutional authority and the political circumstances of the Catholic Church.
The broader development of modern science also depended upon religious scholars, universities, patrons and institutions.
The relationship was complicated.
The Enlightenment: Reason, criticism and political legitimacy
The Enlightenment brought renewed attention to reason, individual rights, political legitimacy and the limits of inherited authority.
Thinkers including John Locke, Montesquieu, David Hume, Voltaire and Immanuel Kant contributed to debates about knowledge, government, religious tolerance and individual freedom.
Kant’s 1784 essay, An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?, offered a particularly relevant formulation.
He described enlightenment as humanity’s emergence from self-imposed immaturity.
His argument concerned the courage to use one’s own understanding rather than relying entirely upon the direction of another.
The idea is central to our investigation.
Intellectual freedom requires more than access to information.
It requires the willingness and capacity to examine what we have been taught to accept.
The Enlightenment’s own contradictions
We must also resist idealising the Enlightenment.
Its thinkers did not consistently apply their arguments about freedom and equality to all human beings.
The period coexisted with colonial expansion, slavery, racial classification and substantial inequalities in political participation.
The language of universal reason was sometimes accompanied by practices that denied universal human equality.
This contradiction is important.
An intellectual movement can articulate principles that exceed the willingness of its own institutions and participants to apply them.
The capacity to recognise that contradiction is itself an expression of critical inquiry.
VI. THE HISTORICAL PATTERN
The preservation of knowledge and the preservation of authority
Across these five periods, a recurring pattern emerges.
Civilisations develop knowledge through interaction, exchange and intellectual adaptation.
Institutions provide the structures through which that knowledge can be preserved and transmitted.
But institutions also acquire interests in maintaining their authority.
Those interests can sometimes conflict with the intellectual freedom that makes further development possible.
We can summarise the historical pattern:
| Historical period | Intellectual contribution | Institutional tension |
| Ancient Mediterranean | Mathematics, astronomy, writing, philosophy and political thought. | Cultural boundaries, political authority and competing traditions. |
| Medieval Christianity | Universities, manuscript preservation, scholastic philosophy and education. | Religious authority and restrictions on particular teachings. |
| The Crusades | Religious mobilisation and international organisation. | Political ambition, financial obligations and commercial interests. |
| Islamic intellectual traditions | Translation, criticism and development of classical and non-classical knowledge. | Religious and political constraints on intellectual life. |
| Renaissance and Enlightenment | Printing, humanism, scientific inquiry and political philosophy. | Censorship, religious conflict, colonialism and unequal application of proclaimed freedoms. |
The pattern is not one of continuous progress.
Periods of intellectual expansion have been followed by restriction. Ideas have travelled across political boundaries while political authorities attempted to control them.
Knowledge has been preserved by institutions that sometimes restricted its interpretation.
And the same societies that produced remarkable intellectual achievements have sometimes punished those who challenged established beliefs.
This is not a uniquely Western characteristic.
It is a recurring human problem.
VII. THE MODERN IMPLICATION
From religious authority to institutional authority
The historical examination brings us back to the contemporary world.
The institutions exercising authority have changed.
The sources of authority have diversified.
Religious institutions no longer exercise the same degree of control over Western public life that they exercised in much of medieval Europe.
But this does not mean that the underlying human problem has disappeared.
Political parties, corporations, universities, professional organisations, media institutions and governments can all develop systems of belief and internal cultures that discourage questioning.
Commercial organisations may protect established business models.
Political organisations may discourage challenges to leadership or policy.
Universities may become preoccupied with institutional reputation and performance measures.
Government departments may prioritise administrative procedures over the people those procedures are intended to serve.
Consultancy firms may develop considerable influence over public policy while the institutions that commission their services gradually lose internal expertise.
These are not identical phenomena, and each requires its own evidence.
But they raise a common question:
Who is permitted to question the institution, and what happens when someone does?
The modern prison of the mind need not be built around religious doctrine.
It can be constructed from economic assumptions, political loyalties, professional incentives, commercial interests or inherited cultural explanations.
The walls may be different.
The underlying human vulnerability remains.
Conclusion: The Freedom to Question
The history of Western civilisation is not the history of a single culture discovering truth independently.
It is the history of ideas travelling between societies, being preserved, translated, challenged, adapted and extended.
Greek philosophy drew upon a much older intellectual world.
Roman civilisation absorbed and transformed Greek traditions.
Medieval European scholarship was enriched by knowledge transmitted through Islamic and Jewish intellectual communities.
The Renaissance and Enlightenment emerged from a long history of intellectual exchange, institutional development and challenges to inherited authority.
No civilisation is entirely self-made.
No intellectual tradition possesses an exclusive claim to truth.
And no institution should be permitted to declare its own explanations beyond examination.
The historical record also demonstrates that the preservation of knowledge and the preservation of authority are not always the same undertaking.
Institutions may protect the intellectual traditions from which they derive their legitimacy while simultaneously restricting the questions that threaten their established position.
This is the central tension of the prisons of the mind.
The problem is not religion itself, nor is secularism an automatic guarantee of intellectual freedom.
The problem arises whenever authority becomes more concerned with protecting its explanations than examining their validity.
A society does not demonstrate its intellectual maturity by how confidently it expresses its beliefs, but by how willingly it permits those beliefs to be examined.
The right to question is not simply a privilege granted to those who agree with us.
It matters most when the question comes from someone whose conclusions make us uncomfortable.
And perhaps the greatest danger is not that people disagree.
It is that they gradually lose the ability to disagree constructively, examine evidence together and change their minds without experiencing that change as defeat.
The first step towards intellectual freedom is recognising that the boundaries of our understanding are not necessarily the boundaries of reality.
A civilisation that cannot question itself eventually becomes a prisoner of its own explanations.
And thus, we create prisons of the mind.
The bars are invisible because we have mistaken them for the boundaries of the world.
A final question for the reader:
If the beliefs that shape our understanding of the world were inherited rather than independently examined, how would we know which of them deserve to survive?
We should not ask people to escape one prison of the mind by inviting them into another. Exchanging one warden for another is not intellectual freedom. It is merely a change of authority.
Nor is it ethical to replace one prescribed interpretation of the world with another and call the result enlightenment.
The purpose of critical inquiry is not to establish a new orthodoxy, but to make orthodoxy itself open to examination. It must leave room for disagreement, uncertainty, discovery and the possibility that our own conclusions may be wrong.
We do not liberate minds by telling people what to think. We help create the conditions in which they can think for themselves.
Intellectual freedom means retaining the right to question even those ideas we have come to regard as our own.
The objective is not to replace the prison. It is to remove the bars.
References
These are the principal scholarly sources supporting the historical discussion:
- Phoenician and Greek alphabets: Madadh Richey, The Alphabet and its Legacy, Oxford Handbook of the Phoenician and Punic Mediterranean. The research establishes the longer history of alphabetic writing and the Phoenician contribution to the Greek adaptation. OUP Academic
- The Fourth Crusade: Thomas F. Madden, The Fourth Crusade, Cambridge History of the Crusades (2026). Also Savvas Neocleous, Financial, chivalric or religious? The motives of the Fourth Crusaders reconsidered (2012). These are particularly useful because they demonstrate that the motives and diversion remain subjects of historical debate. Cambridge University Press
- Medieval universities: Jacques Verger, The Universities and Scholasticism, New Cambridge Medieval History. Cambridge University Press
- Islamic and European intellectual exchange: Charles Burnett, Translation and Transmission of Greek and Islamic Science to Latin Christendom, Cambridge History of Science. Cambridge University Press
- Arabic philosophy and the Latin West: Influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on the Latin West, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- The broader transmission of knowledge: Benno van Dalen, Between Orient and Occident: Transformation of Knowledge, Annals of Science (2011). Taylor & Francis Online









